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Jon	McGinnis	“Experimental	thoughts	on	thought	experiments	in	medieval	Islam”		Abstract	The	study	begins	with	the	language	employed	in	and	the	psychological	basis	of	thought	experiments	as	understood	by	certain	medieval	Arabic	philosophers.	It	then	provides	a	taxonomy	of	different	kinds	of	thoughts	experiments	used	in	the	medieval	Islamic	world.	These	include	purely	fictional	thought	experiments,	idealizations	and	finally	thought	experiments	using	ingenious	machines.	The	study	concludes	by	suggesting	that	thought	experiments	provided	a	halfway	house	during	this	period	between	a	staunch	rationalism	and	an	emerging	empiricism.		1.	Introduction		 There	is	no	(medieval)	Arabic	term	or	phrase	for	“thought	experiment”.	Be	that	as	it	may,	medieval	philosophers	and	scientists	working	in	Arabic	both	concretely	employed	thought	experiments	in	their	philosophies	and	discussed	their	merits	and	demerits	abstractly.	Indeed,	it	would	seem	that	thought	experiments	truly	captured	the	imagination	of	medieval	thinkers	in	the	Muslim	world,	who	left	behind	a	significant	body	of	examples	and	analyses	of	such	experiments.	What	follows	makes	no	pretense	to	being	a	complete	history	of	that	body	of	work.	Instead,	this	study	focuses	primarily,	although	by	no	means	exclusively,	on	thought	experiments	as	they	are	used	and	discussed	in	Ibn	Sīnā	(980–1037),	the	Avicenna	of	Latin	fame.	Along	the	way,	however,	this	study	also	touches	on	other	notable	figures	and	their	uses	and	thoughts	about	thought	experiments.	These	figures	include	the	famed	medieval	Arabic	optician	Ibn	al-Haytham	(965–1040,	Lt.	Alhazen)	and	the	renowned	Muslim	Theologian	Abū	Ḥamid	al-Ghazālī	(1058–1111).	As	a	first	pass,	one	can	divide	thought	experiments	in	the	medieval	Arabic	world	into	two	classes:	those	that	are	in	principle	impossible	to	carry	out	and	those	
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that	at	least	appear	to	be	possible	to	carry	out	even	if	in	practice	they	cannot.	Examples	from	contemporary	philosophy	of	the	first	class	include	zombie	worlds	and	persons	splitting	and	recombining,	etc.	In	the	medieval	period	just	as	now	such	thought	experiments	functioned	primarily	as	intuition	pumps	intended	to	give	someone	a	senses	of	what	is	at	least	possible.	I	refer	to	this	class	of	thought	experiments	as	“fictional	thought	experiments”.	Contemporary	examples	of	the	second	class	of	thought	experiments	abound	in	the	works	of	Einstein,	as,	for	instance,	riding	a	light	beam	or	his	use	of	moving	trains	and	lightening	flashes	in	relation	to	simultaneity	or	one’s	expected	experience	in	a	free	falling	elevator	to	explain	gravity.	Since	within	the	medieval	period	thought	experiments	of	this	sort	frequently	describe	idealized	accounts	of	otherwise	realizable	situations,	I	refer	to	this	class	as	“idealized	thought	experiments.”	The	class	of	idealized	thought	experiments	further	divides	into	those	that	appeal	to	some	form	of	mechanical	apparatus,	to	which	the	name	“mechanical	thought	experiments”	is	appropriate,	and	those	that	do	not.	Continuing	this	first	pass,	medieval	thinkers	in	the	Muslim	world	also	had	different	aims	for	thought	experiments.	In	some	cases,	the	aim	was	simply	to	help	one	envision	or	vividly	to	grasp	some	abstract	conclusion	of	a	demonstration.	As	such,	the	thought	experiments	are	not	integral	to	the	actual	proof(s)	for	the	desired	conclusion.	In	other	cases,	a	thought	experiment	is	integral	to	the	proof	in	that	it	either	constitutes	the	whole	of	the	argument	or	is	intended	to	establish	a	necessary	premise	for	the	argument.	Additionally,	in	those	cases	where	the	thought	
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experiment	intends	to	prove	a	premise,	it	might	show	that	some	state	of	affairs	is	at	least	possible	or	more	significantly	that	some	scenario	is	factive.	Towards	developing	these	sketchy	remarks,	I	begin	with	a	brief	discussion	about	the	language	and	psychology	of	imagination,	particularly	as	it	occurs	in	the	works	of	Avicenna.	That	Avicenna	in	fact	embedded	thought	experiments	within	an	overall	psychology	seems	to	set	him	apart	from	the	thinkers	that	preceded	him.	Following	the	comments	on	psychology,	the	remainder	of	the	study	is	a	taxonomy	of	various	sorts	of	thought	experiments	used	among	thinkers	in	the	medieval	Islamic	world:	first,	instances	of	fictional	ones	and	second	idealized	ones.	When	possible,	I	also	discuss	the	philosophical	attitudes	and	responses	to	the	various	thought	experiments.	What	I	hope	emerges	is	a	sketch	of	the	place	of	thought	experiments	among	medieval	Arabic-speaking	philosophers	and	scientists	that	others	may	use	to	fill	in	the	whole	picture.		2.	The	Language	and	Psychology	of	Thought	Experiments	in	the	Medieval	Muslim	World1	While	there	is	little	doubt	that	ancient	Greek	philosophers	crafted	and	employed	what	we	now	call	“thought	experiments,”	(see	Ierodiakonou	and	Becker	in	the	present	volume),	Katerina	Ierodiakonou	has	also	noted,	“there	is	no	evidence	that	[the	ancients]	classified	examples	based	on	imaginary	or	invented	assumptions	in	a	special	category”	(see	Ierodiakonou	in	the	present	volume,	p.	xxx).	By	the	time																																																									1	The	most	detailed	discussion	to	date	about	the	relation	of	thought	experiments	to	theories	of	psychology	developed	in	the	medieval	Arabic	world	is	Tanelli	Kukkonen’s	landmark	2014	article,	to	which	this	section	is	heavily	indebted.	
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of	Avicenna,	however,	the	premises	driving	thought	experiments	were	seen	to	form	a	special	category	or	at	the	very	least	to	present	a	special	problem.	To	appreciate	the	problem	one	must	begin	with	the	language	that	Aristotle	and	his	commentators	used	for	thought	experiments,	for	it	is	that	terminology	that	medieval	Arabic-speaking	philosophers	primarily	inherited	and	used	when	constructing	or	discussing	thought	experiments.	Perhaps	most	frequently	Aristotle	introduces	thought	experiments	with	a	conditional	statement	(See	Kukkonen	2002	and	2014,	esp.	§I;	and	Ierodiakonou	2005,	esp.	§IV).	The	conditional’s	antecedent	then	functions	as	an	initial	supposition	that	governs	the	thought	experiment.	In	some	places—like	Physics,	7.1,	242a9–10,	where	Aristotle	agues	against	the	possibility	of	self-motion—he	explicitly	introduces	a	thought	experiment	as	a	hypothesis	or	supposition	(hupekeito).	In	medieval	Arabic,	or	at	least	in	Avicenna’s	philosophical	vocabulary,	the	notion	of	an	hypothesis	or	supposition,	particularly	as	used	in	thought	experiments,	is	usually	rendered	by	farḍ.	Additionally,	Aristotle	and	his	commentators	sometimes	refer	to	thought	experiments	using	terms	derived	from	noein,	“to	think”.	One	example	in	Aristotle	is	at	Physics,	3.8,	208a14–16,	where	he	criticizes	certain	thought	experiments	involving	infinity.	Aristotle’s	late	Neoplatonic	commentator,	John	Philoponus	(490–570),	in	his	commentary	on	the	Physics	(Philoponus,	In	Physicorum,	574.14;	575.8;	10;	18)	has	a	more	approving	appraisal	of	experiments	“in	thought”	(kat’	epinoian)	when	defending	the	idea	of	an	immaterial	extension.	The	Greek	term	noein	and	its	cognates	were	frequently	rendered	into	Arabic	with	some	form	of	ʿaql,	“to	intellect”.	
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The	objects	of	intellect	(maʿqūlāt)	indicate	the	universal	essences	of	things	abstracted	from	their	material	conditions.	As	such	the	objects	of	intellect	hardly	seem	suitable	in	cases	where	particulars	are	being	imagined	or	where	counterfactual	premises	are	needed.	What	is	needed	in	these	cases	are	more	fantastical	imaginations,	in	Greek	
phantasia.	The	transliteration	fanṭāsīyā	or	the	native	term	khayāl	was	frequently	used	in	Arabic	to	capture	the	notion	of	phantasia.	Among	medieval	Arabic	Peripatetics	both	fanṭāsīyā	and	khayāl	were	used	to	indicate	either	a	particular	psychological	faculty,	namely,	imagination,	or	the	product	of	some	internal	psychological	faculty.	The	recognized	difficulty	with	using	mere	imaginations	or	fantasies	in	thoughts	experiments	is	that	there	seems	to	be	no	check	on	the	imaginative	faculty	to	ensure	that	its	objects	tell	us	something	informative	about	the	world.	It	is	just	such	a	concern	that	prompted	the	late	Hellenistic	Neoplatonist,	Simplicius	(c.	490–c.	560),	to	complain	about	putting	one’s	faith	in	such	fantasies	(Simplicius,	In	De	caelo,	418.30).	One	is	now	in	a	position	to	see	the	special	problem	that	Avicenna	seems	to	recognize	about	the	premises	used	in	thought	experiments.	If	these	premises	are	products	of	the	faculty	of	intellect,	then,	as	Taneli	Kukkonen	acutely	observes,	they	“only	idealize	material	circumstances	in	the	framework	of	a	well-defined	set	of	assumed	natural	laws	and	invariance”	(Kukkonen	2014,	446).	In	other	words,	premises	produced	by	the	intellect	do	not	lend	themselves	to	the	counterfactual	scenarios	that	frequently	are	at	the	core	of	a	thought	experiments.	Alternatively,	if	the	premises	of	thought	experiments	are	nothing	more	than	unbridled	compositions	
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of	the	imagination,	then	there	is	no	assurance	that	their	content	connects	up	with	anything	in	the	world	so	as	to	give	one	a	deeper	insight	into	the	world.	For	Avicenna	the	question	at	stake	is	a	psychological	one:	what	faculty	of	the	soul	produces	the	premises	employed	in	(legitimate)	thought	experiments	as	opposed	to	wild	ravings?	Intellect	seems	too	restricted	and	imagination	seems	too	unrestrained.	Avicenna’s	solution	to	this	dilemma	was	to	introduce	a	new	internal	sensory	faculty,	wahm,	which	for	lack	of	any	exact	English	translation	is	usually	termed	the	estimative	faculty.	(For	discussions	of	Avicenna’s	theory	of	wahm	see	Black	1993,	Hasse	2000,	esp.	II.2,	Hall	2006,	Kukkonen	2014,	esp.	§3.)	Avicenna	identifies	the	estimative	faculty	among	the	five	internal	perceptive	faculties,	which	are	common	to	humans	and	(higher)	non-human	animals	alike	(Avicenna	De	anima,	4.3).	These	faculties	include	common	sense,	memory,	the	retentive	and	compositive	imaginations	and	finally	the	estimative	faculty.	According	to	Avicenna,	the	estimative	faculty	perceives	non-sensible	features	or	intentions	(sing.	maʿná)	within	sensible	particular	things.	The	classic	example	is	the	sheep’s	recognition	of	the	particular	ferocity	in	a	given	wolf,	for	while	ferocity	is	not	itself	something	sensible	it	is	manifested	in	the	sensible	features	of	the	wolf,	like	its	sharp	fangs	and	claws	and	the	carnivorous	odor	that	it	exudes.	In	non-human	animals	the	estimative	faculty	is	the	highest	functioning	psychological	power,	less	than	intellect	but	also	more	than	mere	imagination.	It	allows	these	animals	to	interact	with	the	world	around	them	in	a	fairly	accurate	way.	Even	in	humans,	according	to	Avicenna,	it	is	the	estimative	faculty	that	allows	us	to	navigate	many	of	our	day-to-day	interactions.	
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Additionally,	Avicenna	appeals	to	the	estimative	faculty	to	explain	the	objects	and	premises	of	the	mathematical	sciences.	The	objects	of	mathematics,	Avicenna	tells	us,	are	certain	formal	features	of	material	objects	but	which	can	be	considered	in	the	estimative	faculty	as	abstracted	from	their	material	conditions,	like,	for	example,	squareness	(Avicenna,	Madkhal,	1.2,	12–13).	In	this	respect,	the	estimative	faculty	is	what	allows	the	mathematician	to	consider	perfect	geometrical	figures	or	numbers	in	the	abstract	even	though	these	are	never	instantiated	physically;	it	is	the	power	that	allows	the	physicists	to	imagine	perfectly	frictionless	planes	or	a	sphere’s	touching	a	two-dimensional	surface	at	a	single	point,	even	though	again	in	the	nitty-gritty	world	around	us	none	of	these	exists.	These	mathematical	abstracta,	Avicenna	says,	exist	by	supposition	(bi-l-farḍ),	usually	a	supposition	imagined	by	the	estimative	faculty.	That	is	to	say,	while	mathematical	abstracta	exist	in	a	mental	act	of	conceptualization	(taṣawwur),	they	do	not	exists,	at	least	not	in	the	exact	way	that	the	mathematician	investigates	them,	in	the	concrete	material	particulars	that	populate	the	world.	It	is	the	estimative	faculty,	then,	that	provides	mathematicians	and	(theoretical)	physicists	with	an	idealized	picture	of	the	world.	In	this	respect,	the	estimative	faculty	offers	up	a	rough	and	ready	guide	to	real	physical	possibilities.	Still	one	must	be	careful	to	distinguish	between	what	exists	as	such	in	the	estimative	faculty	and	what	actually	exist	as	separate	in	the	world.	For	Avicenna,	if	one	is	to	move	from	the	possibilities	imagined	in	the	estimative	faculty	to	what	actually	exists,	one	must	also	have	a	demonstration	or	provide	some	actual	instance	in	the	world	of	what	the	estimative	faculty	posits.	
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To	sum	up,	Avicenna	developed	the	notion	of	an	estimative	faculty	in	order	to	explain	a	number	of	disparate,	albeit	related,	phenomena.	Among	these	phenomena	are	the	semi-rational	thoughts	and	cognitive	processes	of	those	higher	animals	that	lack	an	intellect.	Another	was	to	show	how	idealizations	used	in	mathematics,	which	do	not	actually	exist	separately	in	the	world,	can	be	informative	about	the	world.	Finally,	the	estimative	faculty	provides	Avicenna	with	a	psychological	underpinning	for	thought	experiments,	which	does	justice	to	their	frequently	counterfactual	nature	while	also	explaining	how	they	can	have	import	about	the	world	as	it	actually	is.		3.	Fictional	Thought	Experiments	in	the	Medieval	Islamic	World		In	this	section	I	consider	two	sorts	of	fictional	thought	experiments	with	very	different	aims.	In	one	case,	the	thought	experiment	functions	as	a	subsidiary	aid	to	help	one	better	grasp	the	conclusion	of	some	argument	that	is	independent	of	the	thought	experiment.	In	the	other	case,	the	thought	experiment	is	integral	to	the	overall	argument.	Again	fictional	thought	experiments	proceed	from	an	initial	supposition	that	is	physically	impossible	in	principle	to	carry	out,	although	presumably	an	all-powerful	agent,	like	God,	could	realize	the	scenario.	Arguably,	the	best	known	fictional	thought	experiment	coming	from	the	medieval	Islamic	world	is	Avicenna’s	famous	“flying	man”	(see	Marmura	1986,	Druart	1988,	Hasse	2000,	esp.	II.1).	Here	is	that	thought	experiment	in	Avicenna’s	own	words:		
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One	should	imagine	through	an	act	of	the	estimative	faculty	(yatawahhama)	as	if	one	of	us	were	created	complete	and	perfect	all	at	once	but	his	sight	is	veiled	from	directly	observing	the	things	of	the	external	world.	He	is	created	as	though	floating	in	air	or	in	a	void	but	without	the	air	supporting	him	such	that	he	would	feel	it,	and	the	limbs	of	his	body	are	stretched	out	and	away	from	one	another,	so	they	do	not	come	into	contact	or	touch.	Then	he	considers	whether	he	can	assert	the	existence	of	his	self.	He	has	no	doubts	about	asserting	his	self	as	something	that	exists	without	also	[having	to]	assert	the	existence	of	any	of	his	exterior	or	interior	parts,	his	heart,	his	brain,	or	anything	external.	(Avicenna,	De	anima,	1.1,	16)		Avicenna	presents	this	thought	experiment	no	fewer	than	five	times	throughout	his	oeuvre.2	The	purpose	of	the	thought	experiment	is	to	get	one	to	think	of	one’s	self	(dhāt)	as	perhaps	distinct	from	one’s	body	or	sensible	apprehensions.	For	it	certainly	seems	possible,	even	if	only	by	an	act	of	God,	that	an	individual	could	come	into	existence	all	at	once	devoid	of	any	sensory	input,	sensations	or	sensible	memories.	Yet	even	in	this	deprived	state	the	individual,	one	imagines,	would	be	aware	or	conscious	of	his	or	her	self	(shuʿūr	bi-dhāt),	or	so	Avicenna	imagines.	(For	a	detailed	study	of	self-awareness	(or	consciousness)	in	the	thought	of	Avicenna	see	Jari	Kaukua	2015.)	
																																																								2These	are	in	De	anima	1.1	(translated	here)	and	5.7,	the	Mashriqīyūn,	Ishārāt	wa-l-
tanbīhāt	and	al-Risāla	al-Aḍḥawīya	fī	l-maʿād.	See	Hasse	2000,	80–7	for	a	discussion	of	the	differences	among	the	various	presentations.	
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What	is	important	to	note	is	that	Avicenna	does	not	claim	here	that	this	thought	experiment	demonstrates	that	the	human	soul	or	self	is	immaterial.	What	is	needed	truly	to	establish	that	conclusion	is	a	proper	demonstration,	which	Avicenna	provides	in	addition	to	the	thought	experiment	(see	Avicenna,	De	anima,	5.2).	Instead,	the	thought	experiment,	Avicenna	tells	us,	is	only	a	way	of	arousing	(tanbīh)	in	us	some	consideration	of	what	an	immaterial	existence	might	be	like	(Avicenna,	
De	anima,	1.1,	15).	Interestingly,	Avicenna	also	uses	a	close	etymological	cousin	of	tanbīh,	namely,	tanabbuh,	again	“arousing,”	in	association	with	the	aim	of	induction	(istiqrāʾ)	(Avicenna,	Burhān,	3.5,	158).	Induction,	Avicenna	informs	us,	cannot	establish	some	universally	true	claim,	but	at	best	can	only	show	that	something	is	probable	(Avicenna,	Burhān,	1.9,	48).	While	the	link	is	admittedly	tenuous	it	does	suggest	that	Avicenna	may	have	viewed	thought	experiments	as	at	least	on	par	with	induction	in	scientific	practice.	Avicenna,	however,	does	not	use	fictional	thought	experiments	solely	as	incitements,	which	play	no	substantive	role	in	demonstrations.	In	some	cases,	they	form	an	integral	part	of	a	demonstration	as	in	indirect	proofs.	In	fact,	Avicenna	relies	on	thought	experiments	and	the	use	of	the	estimative	faculty	in	just	this	way	scores	of	times	throughout	his	Physics.	Examples	include	Physics,	2.1	when	discussing	self-motion	(discussed	in	depth	in	Kukkonen	2014);	numerously	throughout	Physics,	2.7–9	and	4.11,	when	discussing	place,	void	and	space	(McGinnis	2007a	and	Lammer	2016);	thought	experiments	also	frequently	appear	in	his	criticism	of	the	infinitely	small,	i.e.,	atomism	at	Physics,	3.4–5	(Lettinck	1999	
	 11	
and	McGinnis	2015)	and	the	infinitely	large	at	Physics,	3.7–9	(McGinnis	2010).	These	are	just	to	mention	some	of	the	more	prominent	appearances	of	thought	experiments	within	the	works	of	Avicenna.	Let	me	consider	briefly	some	of	Avicenna’s	comments	concerning	the	void	and	how	one	thought	experiment	features	prominently	in	his	refutation	of	it.	Avicenna	introduces	the	notion	of	a	void	(khalāʾ),	by	claiming	that	its	proponents	appealed	to	a	certain	thought	experiment	to	motivate	their	position	(Avicenna,	Physics,	2.6	[5]).	In	the	thought	experiment,	the	proponents	of	the	void	consider	some	contained	body,	whether	the	water	in	a	jug	or	what	lies	between	the	moon’s	orbit	around	the	earth.	Here	the	contained	body	exists	within	certain	limits	of	the	containing	body.	They,	then,	through	an	act	of	the	estimative	faculty,	Avicenna	continues,	imagine	that	the	contained	body	is	eliminated;	however,	the	elimination	of	the	contained	body	does	not	eliminate	the	interval	or	dimension	(buʿd)	between	the	limits	of	the	containing	body.	What	is	eliminated	and	what	is	not	eliminated,	however,	are	distinct	things.	Thus,	the	thought	experiment	concludes,	the	interval	or	dimension	is	distinct	from	the	body	existing	in	it,	albeit,	that	interval	is	something	existing	together	with	the	body	when	the	body	exists	in	it.	Avicenna’s	criticism	of	this	argument	is	precisely	to	appeal	to	the	limits	of	the	estimative	faculty’s	abilities	(Avicenna,	Physics,	2.9	[11]).	To	begin,	Avicenna	happily	endorses	the	general	method	of	analysis	(taḥlīl)	that	the	thought	experiment	employs:	one	uses	the	estimative	faculty	to	isolate	some	formal	feature	within	a	body	for	closer	scrutiny.	In	fact,	Avicenna	maintains	that	it	is	just	this	method	that	allows	one	conceptually	to	distinguish	the	form	of	a	body	from	its	matter.	The	
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problem	in	the	present	case	comes	from	thinking	that	what	is	separable	in	thought	must	also	be	separable	in	reality.	He	clarifies	by	appealing	to	the	form-matter	case:	Were	one	able	to	remove	all	forms	from	some	matter,	the	matter,	Avicenna	observes,	would	simply	cease	to	exist,	for	the	form	is	the	principle	of	actualization.	As	for	the	case	of	the	imagined	void	interval,	he	writes:		Let	us	grant	that	this	interval	is	assumed	in	the	estimative	faculty,	when	a	certain	body	or	bodies	are	eliminated.	How	does	one	know	that	this	act	of	the	estimative	faculty	is	not	false	[when	applied	to	something	existing	separate	from	the	estimative	faculty],	such	that	what	follows	upon	it	is	absurd,	and	whether	this	assumption	is,	in	fact,	even	possible,	such	that	what	follows	upon	it	is	necessary?	(Avicenna,	Physics,	2.9	[11])		Avicenna’s	complaint	is	twofold.	First,	if	the	thought	experiment	is	to	show	the	extra-mental	existence	of	a	void	interval,	one	must	show	that	a	separate	void	interval	can	exist	separate	from	an	act	of	the	estimative	faculty.	In	other	words,	one	must	demonstrate	that	the	separate	existence	of	a	void	does	not	lead	to	some	absurdity,	as	in	the	form-matter	case,	where	the	actual	elimination	of	form	would	entail	the	actualization	of	matter	without	its	having	any	principle	of	actualization,	i.e.,	any	form.	Second,	even	assuming	that	one	can	show	that	the	separate	existence	of	a	void	is	possible,	the	thought	experiment	has	not	shown	that	a	void’s	existence	is	
necessary.	A	hallmark	of	scientific	knowledge,	however,	which	goes	back	at	least	as	
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far	as	Plato	and	Aristotle	(cf.	Plato,	Theatetus,	152C3	and	Aristotle,	Posterior	
Analytics,	A.2,	71b9–12),	is	that	scientific	knowledge	(Gk.,	epistēmē,	Ar.	ʿilm)	is	necessary	and	explanatory	of	what	is.	Avicenna	accepts	these	criteria	for	knowledge.	Thus	he	complains	that	the	thought	experiment	alone	has	failed	to	meet	one	of	the	conditions	for	knowledge;	what	is	additionally	needed	to	show	that	a	void’s	existence	is	necessary	is	a	demonstration.	None	of	this	is	to	say	that	a	thought	experiment	for	Avicenna	cannot	be	an	integral	part	of	a	demonstration.	His	own	refutation	of	the	void	provides	one	with	just	such	an	example.	At	Physics,	2.8,	Avicenna	aims	to	show	that	the	existence	of	a	void	would	make	motion	impossible.	He	identifies	three	general	sorts	of	motion:	natural	circular	motion	(such	as	that	of	the	heavens),	natural	rectilinear	motion	(such	as	that	of	the	elements,	earth,	water,	air	and	fire)	and	finally	forced	motion	(such	as	a	projectile	like	an	arrow	or	a	thrown	ball).	Thought	experiments	in	the	form	of	indirect	proofs	for	the	impossibility	of	a	void	appear	in	Avicenna’s	treatment	of	all	three	classes	of	motion.	I	shall	consider	just	one:	his	refutation	of	the	possibility	of	forced	motion	in	a	void	(Avicenna,	Physics,	2.8	[18]).	The	argument	begins	by	imagining	along	with	the	proponents	of	the	void	that	an	infinite	void	exists	in	which	objects	move.	Now	in	the	case	of	forced	motion,	for	example	my	shooting	an	arrow,	I,	by	means	of	the	bow,	impart	a	certain	motive	power	to	the	arrow.	Given	this	scenario,	either	the	arrow	will	continue	in	its	motion	unabated	infinitely	or	it	will	come	to	a	stop.	The	arrow	cannot	continue	on	infinitely,																																																									3	Admittedly	Plato	is	speaking	about	perception	here,	but	the	suggestion	is	that	perception	just	is	knowledge	because	it	has	the	hallmarks	of	knowledge:	it	is	about	what	is	and	is	infallible	(apseudēs).	
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Avicenna	believes,	for	a	finite	agent,	and	I	am	finite,	can	only	ever	produce	a	finite	effect,	but	should	the	arrow	continue	moving	without	ever	stopping,	I	would	have	produced	an	infinite	effect.	If	the	arrow	ceases	to	move,	then	the	privation	or	absence	(ʿadam)	of	motion	must	belong	to	the	arrow	either	essentially	or	owing	to	some	external	cause.	If	not	moving,	that	is,	the	absence	of	motion,	belonged	to	the	arrow	essentially,	then	its	motion	would	be	impossible	from	the	start,	for	its	essence	would	preclude	its	moving.	As	for	an	external	thing’s	bringing	the	arrow	to	rest,	we	have	been	asked	to	imagine	a	void,	and	so	something	literally	devoid	of	any	causes	that	might	arrest	the	arrow’s	motion.	Of	course,	Avicenna	develops	each	of	these	moments	in	the	argument	in	greater	detail,	but	almost	every	moment	has	one	imagining	how	the	projectile	would	move	or	come	to	rest	in	a	void.	In	this	case	and	the	others	where	thoughts	experiments	are	integral	to	the	demonstration	Avicenna	is	not	restricted	to	limiting	his	conclusion	to	a	mere	possibility	existing	in	the	estimative	faculty.	That	is	because	these	arguments	are	intended	precisely	to	show	that	the	separate	existence	of	the	subject	of	the	thought	experiment	is	impossible.	Thus,	if	the	initial	supposition	plus	a	set	of	auxiliary	premises,	all	of	which	are	taken	to	be	true	or	even	necessary,	lead	to	an	absurdity	or	impossibility,	the	initial	supposition	must	be	jettison.	None	of	this	is	new	to	Avicenna.		Still,	it	does	suggest	that	Avicenna	was	principled	with	respect	to	his	use	of	fictional	thought	experiments:	either	they	must	be	accompanied	by	an	independent	demonstration	or	they	are	conceded	because	one’s	opponent	actually	accepts	them	as	true	depictions	of	reality.		
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4.	Idealized	Thought	Experiments	in	the	Medieval	Islamic	World		What	distinguishes	idealized	thoughts	experiments	from	fictional	thought	experiments	is	that	the	former	at	least	give	the	appearance	that	they	are	physically	possible	and	so	could	actually	be	realized	without	necessarily	appealing	to	the	action	of	an	all-powerful	agent.	I	consider	two	broad	classes	of	idealized	thought	experiments	used	in	the	medieval	Islamic	world:	mechanical	thought	experiments	and	non-mechanical	ones.	Mechanical	thought	experiments	appeal	to	some	ingenuous	machine	or	apparatus	and	at	the	very	least	give	the	impression	that	one	could	actually	carry	out	the	experiment	or	build	the	apparatus.	Before	turning	to	these	mechanical	thought	experiments,	let	me	begin	with	a	classic	example	of	a	non-mechanical	idealized	thought	experiment.	In	his	Incoherence	of	the	Philosophers,	al-Ghazālī	(1058–1111)	challenges	the	philosophers’	insistence	that	a	principle	of	sufficient	reason	must	govern	all	actions.	He	denies	that	the	principle	necessarily	applies	when	it	comes	to	the	choices	of	volitional	agents.	More	specifically	al-Ghazālī	wants	to	show	that	even	if	presented	with	two	completely	indiscernible	options,	God	and	even	humans	can,	unlike	Buridan’s	ass,	choose	one	over	the	other.	His	argument	for	this	conclusion	relies	solely	on	the	following	idealized	thought	experiment:		Let	us	suppose	(nafriḍu)	two	indiscernible	dates	immediately	before	someone	who	looks	on	them	hungrily,	but	is	incapable	of	taking	both.	He	will	take	one	of	them	necessarily	through	an	attribute	whose	character	is	to	
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specify	one	thing	from	its	like.	Everything	you	mentioned	concerning	specifications	of	superiority,	proximity	or	facility	of	access,	we	determine,	by	supposition	(ʿalá	farḍ),	to	be	absent,	but	the	possibility	of	taking	remains.	You	have	two	options:	either	(1)	to	say	that	the	indiscernibility	in	relation	to	his	desires	is	wholly	inconceivable,	which	is	fatuous	given	that	the	supposition	[of	the	date’s	indiscernibility]	is	possible,	or	(2)	to	say	that	when	the	indiscernibility	is	supposed,	the	hungrily	longing	man	would	always	remain	undecided,	staring	at	the	two	[dates],	but	not	taking	either	of	them	simply	by	willing,	but	choosing	to	stand	aloof	from	the	desire,	which	is	also	absurd,	whose	falsity	is	known	necessarily.	(al-Ghazālī,	Incoherence,	Disc.	1	[46])		The	argument	is	straightforward.	We	are	asked	to	imagine	an	idealized	situation	where	every	conceivable	factor	for	preferring	one	desired	option	over	another	has	been	eliminated.	Al-Ghazālī	takes	it	as	patently	possible	that	the	imagined	scenario	could	exist	in	the	world	and	not	merely	in	the	estimative	faculty.	If	the	situation	is	possible,	then	it	is	certainly	possible	that	the	hungry	man	will	choose	one	piece	of	fruit	over	another	without	any	reason	weighing	in	for	his	preference	for	that	particular	piece.	Indeed,	al-Ghazālī	thinks	that	choosing	in	this	situation	is	not	merely	possible	but	necessary.	He	thus	concludes	that	even	in	humans	there	must	be	some	psychological	faculty	that	chooses	between	indiscernible	things,	called	“will”	or	“volition”	(irāda).	
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I	know	of	no	philosopher	working	within	an	Avicennan	psychological	framework	who	addresses	this	thought	experiment.	Presumably,	if	confronted	with	it,	Avicenna	would	have	required	some	proof	that	the	imagined	scenario	could	exist	in	the	world	and	not	merely	in	the	estimative	faculty.	Perhaps	a	more	interesting	response	comes	from	the	Andalusian	Peripatetic,	Ibn	Rushd	(1126–1198),	that	is,	Averroes.	Although	Averroes’	comments	say	little	about	the	nature	of	idealized	thought	experiments	as	a	class	of	arguments,	they	are	informative	about	the	present	example	(Averroes,	The	Incoherence	of	the	Incoherence,	Disc.	1,	[39–41]).	Averroes	complains	that	al-Ghazālī’s	thought	experiment	does	not	set	out	one	unique	set	of	preferences,	for	example,	to	prefer	to	eat	date1	or	date2.	Instead,	observes	Averroes,	there	are	two	distinct	sets	of	preferences:	(1)	to	eat	or	not	to	eat	and	(2)	to	eat	date1	or	date2.	Of	course	with	respect	to	set	(1),	the	hungry	man	has	every	reason	to	prefer	to	eat	over	not	eating,	and	so	indeed	wills	to	eat	on	the	basis	of	that	reason.	That	action	is	achieved	regardless	of	whether	he	eats	date1	or	date2.	As	for	case	(2),	if	the	man	were	subsequently	asked	why	he	preferred,	for	example,	date1	over	date2,	he	would	say	that	he	did	not	prefer	the	one	date	over	the	other;	he	simply	preferred	to	eat	rather	than	not	to	eat.	Thus,	while	there	is	no	reason	for	preferring	one	date	over	another,	neither	is	there	any	preference	for	one	date	over	another	that	needs	a	reason.	Again,	however,	there	seems	little	to	glean	from	Averroes’	discussion	here	about	the	nature	of	thought	experiments	or	idealization	(although	see	Knuuttila	and	Kukkonen	2011,	esp.	§2).	
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Turning	now	to	the	mechanical	variety	of	idealized	thought	experiments,	for	obvious	reasons	they	were	almost	exclusively	applied	to	issues	and	problems	in	the	natural	sciences.	That	is	because	this	class	involves	describing	a	machine	or	apparatus	that	can,	at	least	in	principle,	be	constructed	and	as	such	must	be	constrained	by	the	laws	of	physics	and	principles	of	mechanics.	One	such	physical	issue,	in	which	there	was	a	proliferation	of	mechanical	thought	experiments,	was	the	problem	of	the	quies	media,	that	is,	medial	rest.	The	issue	at	stake	is	whether	a	body	that	undergoes	contrary	changes	must	come	to	some	rest	between	one	change	and	then	the	contrary	change.	For	example,	must	a	ball	thrown	upward	come	to	a	slight	rest,	be	it	ever	so	short,	before	it	moves	downward	or	can	the	ball	change	from	moving	upward	to	moving	downward	Instantaneously?	Aristotle	in	his	Physics,	8.8,	had	argued	for	a	medial	rest.	His	generally	argument	assumed	something	like	the	following	form.	Let	a	body	move	from	A	to	C.	At	every	moment	in	its	motion	from	A	to	C,	the	body	is	in	a	process	of	arriving	at	C,	whereas	at	every	moment	in	its	motion	from	C	back	to	A	the	body	is	in	a	process	of	arriving	at	A.	A	is	not	C,	and	so	during	the	body’s	motion	back	to	A,	it	is	
not	in	a	process	of	arriving	at	C.	Now	to-be-in-a-process-of-arriving-at-C	and	not-to-be-in-a-process-of-arriving-at-C	are	contradictory	predicates,	and	nothing	can	simultaneously	have	contradictory	predicates.	Hence,	reasons	Aristotle,	there	must	be	some	instant	at	which	the	body	arrives	at	C	and	some	other	instant	at	which	it	departs	C.	Finally,	since	time	is	continuous	and	between	any	two	points	(or	in	this	case	instants,	i.e.,	temporal	points)	on	a	continuum	there	is	some	magnitude,	there	
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must	be	some	temporal	magnitude,	and	so	some	time,	between	the	instant	of	the	body’s	arriving	at	C	and	of	its	departing	from	C	when	it	is	at	rest	at	C.	Aristotle’s	word	on	this	subject	was	far	from	the	last.	Indeed,	the	issue	was	still	very	much	alive	in	Avicenna’s	time	(see	Rashed	1999,	esp.	§2,	Morrison	2005,	58–9	&	91–2	and	Langermann	2008).	In	fact,	the	issue	had	generated	so	much	unrest	that	Avicenna	dedicated	an	entire	chapter	of	his	Physics,	4.8,	to	the	problem.	Avicenna	himself	even	confesses	that	he	did	not	find	the	arguments	on	either	side	particularly	impressive	(Avicenna,	Physics,	4.8	[9]).	The	issue	is	particularly	pressing	for	Avicenna	since	he	provided	an	analysis	of	motion	that	allowed	for	motion	at	an	instant	in	such	a	way	to	avoid	Aristotle’s	conclusion	(see	Hasnawi	2001,	McGinnis	2006	and	Ahmed	2016).	As	for	the	arguments	pro	and	con,	Avicenna	notes	that	the	main	premise	in	arguments	for	there	being	a	rest	between	contrary	motions	involves	identifying	some	purported	impossibility	in	the	situation,	like	the	contradiction	that	Aristotle	mentioned	in	the	above	case.	He	further	notes	that	the	counter	arguments	simply	need	to	show	that	the	instantaneous	change	from	one	type	of	motion	to	its	contrary	is	not	impossible.	Those	who	opposed	Aristotle’s	conclusion	appealed	to	this	last	point,	and	an	easy	enough	way	to	show	that	possibility	is	simply	to	describe	a	machine	that	produces	just	such	a	motion.	Avicenna	himself	mentions	one	such	contraption	proposed	by	the	detractors	of	a	medial	rest	(Avicenna,	Physics,	4.8	[4]).	We	are	to	imagine	a	sphere	mounted	upon	a	wheel	and	the	wheel	makes	a	continuous	rotation.	Next	imagine	a	two-dimensional	plane	above	the	apparatus	that	is	situated	such	that,	when	the	sphere	is	at	its	apex	during	the	wheel’s	rotation,	the	sphere	encounters	that	plane	at	some	
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single	point,	C.	Since	the	wheel	that	is	carrying	the	sphere	is	moving	continuously,	the	sphere	will	touch	C	for	only	an	instant.	Thus,	during	the	sphere’s	ascent	it	will	have	been	in	a	process	of	arriving	at	C,	while	during	its	descent	it	will	be	in	process	of	departing	from,	i.e.,	not	arriving	at,	C,	just	as	Aristotle	describes,	and	yet	contrary	to	Aristotle,	the	sphere	will	be	at	C	for	only	an	instant.	While	the	example	takes	advantage	of	circular	motion,	it	does	suggest	that	a	body	can	actually	be	at	a	point	for	an	instant	and	at	that	instant	change	from	one	sort	of	motion	to	its	contrary.	As	already	noted,	Avicenna	was	not	impressed	with	any	of	the	available	arguments	concerning	this	issue,	pro	or	con.4	His	objection	to	the	present	one	involves	a	digression	about	the	nature	of	mechanical	thought	experiments	more	generally	(Avicenna,	Physics,	4.8	[12]).	His	concerns	are	much	like	those	registered	about	fictional	thought	experiments.	The	difference	is	that,	while	in	the	case	of	fictional	thought	experiments	one	must	provide	a	demonstration	that	what	the	thought	experiment	describes	can	exist	separate	from	the	estimative	faculty,	in	a	mechanical	thought	experiments	one	must	first	ask	if	the	proposed	machine	can	in	fact	actually	work.	Can	it	be	constructed	in	principle?	If	it	cannot,	then	the	thought	experiment	must	be	treated	as	if	it	is	a	fictional	one.	Today	we	might	think	that	the	proposed	thought	experiment	immediately	fails	the	can-it-work	test	since	it	appeals	to	perfects	spheres	and	planes,	i.e.,	mathematically	idealized	ones,	rather	than	to	physical	ones.	In	fact,	Avicenna	mentioned	that	some	complained	about	this	thought	experiments	in	just	this	way.																																																									4	While	Avicenna	ultimately	will	agree	with	Aristotle	that	there	must	be	a	rest	between	contrary	motions,	his	own	unique	argument	for	this	thesis	appeals	to	the	forces	producing	the	motions	rather	than	the	sorts	of	motion	involved.	
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Avicenna	dismisses	the	objection	as	inadequate,	since	in	his	cosmology	there	actually	were	perfectly	instantiated	spheres,	namely,	the	celestial	spheres	that	carry	the	planets	along	their	orbits.	Consequently,	at	least	part	of	the	imagined	apparatus	can,	by	Avicenna’s	lights,	be	physically	instantiated.	Avicenna’s	complaint	comes	when	considering	whether	these	rotating	spheres	can	come	in	contact	with	a	flat	surface	at	a	single	point.	The	perfect	spheres	that	Avicenna	permits	are	embedded	within	one	another.	Thus,	while	a	sphere	may	be	in	contact	with	the	surface	of	another	sphere,	on	Avicenna’s	view,	it	would	not	contact	it	at	a	single	point	but	in	its	entirety,	either	containing	or	being	contained.	He	in	fact	argues	that	one	can	demonstrate	the	physical	impossibility	of	a	sphere’s	actually	touching	a	flat	plane	at	a	single	point,	even	if	one	grants	the	physical	existence	of	both	a	perfect	sphere	and	a	two-dimensional	surface.	He	reasons	thusly:	between	the	flat	surface	and	the	sphere	there	must	be	a	void	or	not.	At	Physics,	2.8,	Avicenna	spilt	much	ink	to	show	that	a	void	is	not	only	physically	impossible	but	also	conceptually	impossible	(McGinnis	2007b,	esp.	§IV	and	Lammer	2016,	§5.3).	Thus,	if	the	proposed	apparatus	entails	a	void,	then	it	entails	an	impossibility,	and	so	must	itself	be	a	vacuous	product	of	the	imagination.	If	there	is	no	void,	Avicenna’s	argument	continues,	then	there	must	be	a	plenum	whose	surface	contacts	the	flat	two-dimensional	plane	and	the	convex	surface	of	the	sphere.	Now,	according	to	the	continuous	theory	of	physical	bodies,	which	Avicenna	adopts,	points	have	no	determinate	existence	in	a	continuous	surface,	save	as	endpoints	of	lines.	Consequently,	Avicenna	goes	on,	points	exist	in	the	continuum	only	if	there	is	a	physical	separation	of	the	continuous	surface,	in	
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which	case	the	point	exists	as	an	endpoint,	otherwise	it	exists	merely	as	a	product	of	the	estimative	faculty’s	positing	the	point.	Thus,	Avicenna	continues,	it	is	impossible	that	the	single	point	of	the	sphere	should	have	some	separate,	determinate	position	in	the	surface	of	the	plenum	that	touches	the	flat	two-dimensional	plane	given	the	very	nature	of	continua.	He	concludes	his	critique	of	this	thought	experiment	thus:		 This	[argument]	makes	the	laws	of	nature	dependent	upon	certain	mathematical	abstractions	of	the	estimative	faculty,	which	is	not	right.	In	fact,	beyond	going	outside	the	discipline	[of	physics],	that	[argument]	doesn’t	even	entail	what	[they]	wanted	it	to	prove,	but	only	requires	that	the	continuity	of	the	two	designated	motions	be	in	the	estimative	faculty.	We,	however,	don’t	deny	that	that	continuity	is	in	the	estimative	faculty.	We	deny	[the	continuity]	only	of	the	natural	things	that	deviate	from	the	abstractions	of	the	estimative	faculty.	(Avicenna,	Physics,	4.8	[12])		 As	a	curious	historical	addendum,	the	post-Avicennan	polymath,	Quṭb	al-Dīn	Shīrāzī	(1236–1311),	showed	how	a	model	used	in	astronomy	could	produce	a	continuous	motion	between	a	body	that	ascends	and	then	descend,	which	is	perhaps	immune	to	Avicenna’s	criticism	(Morrison	2005,	58–9	&	91).	Shīrāzī	took	advantage	of	a	mathematical	devise—the	eponymous	Ṭūsī	couple—that	Naṣīr	al-Dīn	al-Ṭūsī	(1201–74)	had	constructed	to	bring	about	a	better	match	between	astronomical	observations	and	the	predictions	of	the	geocentric	model	of	the	universe	adopted	by	
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ancient	and	medieval	astronomers.	The	Ṭūsī	couple	assumes	two	continuous	and	uniformly	rotating	circles	(but	the	device	could	also	be	constructed	using	spheres).	One	circle	is	inside	the	other	with	the	contained	circle	having	half	of	the	diameter	of	the	containing	circle	and	rotating	twice	as	fast	as	and	in	the	opposite	direction	as	the	containing	circle.	The	overall	effect,	Ṭūsī	observed,	is	that	a	certain	point	on	the	circumference	of	the	smaller	circle	oscillates	up	and	down	the	diameter	of	the	larger	circle.	This	oscillating	“point”	was	subsequently	identified	with	some	planet.5	Shīrāzī’s	contribution	to	the	debate	about	medial	rest	was	to	note	that	since	solely	continuous	rotations	produce	the	oscillation,	the	point/planet	will	come	to	one	endpoint	of	the	diameter	and	then	without	rest	(for	the	rotations	do	not	stop)	instantaneously	move	back	toward	the	other	endpoint.	Consequently,	to	the	extent	that	one	believed	that	the	astronomical	model	used	in	Ptolemaic	systems	described	the	actual	workings	of	the	heavens,	the	Ṭūsī	couple	would	pass	Avicenna’s	can-it-work	test.	Let	me	conclude	with	one	final	set	of	possible	mechanical	idealized	thought	experiments,	now	drawn	from	the	great	medieval	Muslim	optician,	Ibn	al-Haytham.6	(I	say,	“possible”	because	for	some	the	examples	that	I	give	are	seen	as	instances	of	
actual	experiments	rather	than	thought	experiments;	I	let	the	reader	decide.)	Throughout	his	Book	of	Optics	(Kitāb	al-Munāẓir,	Lt.	De	aspectibus)	Ibn	al-Haytham	takes	what	by	all	appearances	is	a	staunch	empirical	approach	to	the	study	of	optics,	suggesting	numerous	experiments	and	apparatus	to	verify	empirically	various																																																									5	A	graphic	representation	can	be	found	on	Wikipedia	under	“Tusi	Couple”:	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tusi_couple.	6	The	position	I	present	here	draws	heavily	upon	A.	Mark	Smith	2015:	ch.	5.	
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principles	used	in	optics.	In	numerous	cases,	he	suggests	a	set	of	experiments	that	require	the	construction	of	highly	precise	apparatuses,	which	he	describes	with	meticulous	care,	indeed	such	care	that	they	appear	to	be	more	idealizations	than	devices	actually	used	by	him.	Unfortunately,	the	exacting	details	of	his	descriptions	and	the	length	it	would	take	to	describe	them	preclude	presenting	even	one	of	them	here	in	full	detail,	although	one	example	might	help	make	my	point.		When	considering	refraction,	Ibn	al-Haytham	describes	an	apparatus	for	testing	the	refractive	properties	of	different	media,	which	requires	as	one	of	its	parts,	a	relatively	large	quarter	sphere	of	glass	(like,	for	example,	ABCD	in	the	diagram).	Rays	of	light	are	allowed	to	pass	through	the	quarter	sphere	before	passing	through	a	different	medium	like	air	or	water.	The	technological	state	of	glass	working,	particularly	at	a	time	before	machine-produced	glassware,	makes	it	difficult	to	assume	that	any	quarter	sphere	produced	in	Ibn	al-Haytham’s	time	would	have	been	free	of	the	various	flaws	that	typify	handmade	glass	items,	such	as	the	tiny	bubbles	or	various	stretch,	mold,	shear	or	pontil	marks.	These	imperfections,	however,	would	have	distorted	the	observed	results	of	the	experiments.	Similarly,	for	the	device	to	give	the	mathematically	exact	results,	which	Ibn	al-Haytham	claims,	the	two	flat	surfaces	of	the	quarter	sphere	would	need	to	be	exactly	perpendicular	and	the	curved	surface	perfectly	convex,	again	features	that	seem	all	but	impossible	given	the	technology	of	the	time.	
A	
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Ibn	al-Haytham	makes	similar	exacting	demands	on	the	specifications	for	another	apparatus,	now	used	in	validating	the	equal-angles	law	found	in	discussions	of	reflection.	Noted	historian	of	science,	A.	Mark	Smith,	has	this	to	say	about	the	level	of	precision	required	of	that	apparatus	in	order	to	get	the	purported	results:		Indeed,	given	[the	apparatus’]	obvious	unfeasibility	as	actually	described—with	all	planes	perfectly	aligned	and	all	measurements	perfectly	reproduced—the	test	appears	to	have	been	an	elaborate	thought	experiments	designed	to	confirm	what	[Ibn	al-Haytham]	already	took	for	granted,	that	is,	that	light	reflects	at	equal	angles.	(Smith	2015,	199)		It	is	not	my	intention	to	diminish	the	significance	of	Ibn	al-Haytham’s	contribution	to	optics—it	is	impressive	indeed—rather,	I	merely	want	to	suggest	that	some	of	his	experiments	might	best	be	classified	as	instances	of	what	I	have	been	calling	idealized	thought	experiments.			4.	Conclusion	There	can	be	little	doubt	that	thinkers	in	the	medieval	Islamic	world	appreciated	the	role	and	significance	of	thoughts	experiments	for	philosophy	and	the	sciences.	Indeed	the	prevalence	of	thoughts	experiments	in	these	areas	seems	to	have	lead	Avicenna	to	explore	the	psychology	behind	them	and	present	rules	for	determining	acceptable	and	unacceptable	use	of	premises	relying	on	them.	
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He	lauded	and	even	employed	thought	experiments	himself	when	used	as	intuition	pumps	primarily	to	arouse	in	us	a	better	understanding	of	some	independently	proven	point.	When	thought	experiments	were	integral	parts	of	a	proof,	however,	he	was	more	hesitant.	If	thought	experiments	were	used	in	indirect	proofs,	they	needed	to	be	part	of	a	conditional	premise,	ideally	functioning	as	the	consequence	of	some	hypothesis	whose	very	possibility	was	being	questioned.	In	any	other	use,	Avicenna	stresses	that	one	must	prove	that	the	situation	imagined	in	the	thought	experiments	can	actually	occur	in	the	real	world,	and	so	does	not	have	its	existence	merely	as	a	product	of	the	mind,	or	particularly,	of	the	estimative	faculty.	In	other	words,	when	thought	experiments	were	to	play	some	integral	role	in	a	proof,	Avicenna	requires	that	the	assumed	scenario	be	executable	at	least	in	principle.	A	scenario	could	be	shown	to	be	executable	in	principle,	at	least	in	some	cases,	if	it	relies	on	a	mechanical	apparatus	that	did	not	violate	any	physical	principles.	Indeed	there	appears	to	have	been	a	proliferation	of	idealized	mechanical	thoughts	experiments	within	natural	philosophy,	whether	physics	proper,	optics,	astronomy	or	the	like.	Such	a	proliferation	at	least	suggests	that	physics	within	the	medieval	Islamic	world	was	beginning	to	show	the	first	tendencies	of	an	experimental	approach	to	the	sciences,	although	this	tendency	is	better	described	in	terms	of	“methodological	experience”	(see	McGinnis	2003	and	Janssens	2004).	Whatever	the	case,	the	use	of	thought	experiments	would	have	been	part	of	an	empiricism	that	went	hand	in	hand	with	a	marked	rationalist	leaning.	
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As	for	evidence	of	this	last	point,	we	have	seen	Avicenna’s	demand	that	thought	experiments	really	need	to	be	accompanied	by	a	demonstration	(burhān).	A	demonstration	in	this	context	would	have	meant	a	logically	valid	syllogism	proceeding	from	necessary	first	principles,	where	first	principles	are	products	of	the	intellect	(ʿaql)	not	the	estimative	faculty.	This	same	tendency	also	seems	present	in	the	experiments	of	Ibn	al-Haytham.	The	punctilious	precision	with	which	he	described	the	apparatus	that	his	experiments	employed	all	but	necessitates	that	the	demands	of	an	idealized	mathematical	demonstrations	directed	his	detailed	instructions.	Finally,	the	medieval	Jewish	philosopher,	Abū	l-Barakāt	(1080–1165),	after	cataloging	various	arguments	against	a	quies	media,	notes	that	those	who	favor	there	being	a	medial	rest	would	only	be	satisfied	by	a	demonstration	proceeding	from	the	intellect	(Abū	l-Barakāt,	al-Muʿtabar,	2.14,	97).	By	implication	mechanical	arguments,	whether	of	the	thought	experiment	variety	or	otherwise,	would	have	taken	a	back	seat	to	a	proper	intellectual	demonstration.	To	conclude,	thought	experiments	in	the	medieval	Islamic	milieu	seemed	to	function	as	a	halfway	house	between	empiricism	and	rationalism,	allowing	the	idealization	that	rationalism	demands	while	also	appealing	to	sensible	intuitions	favored	by	an	empiricist	approach	to	the	sciences.		Bibliography		Abū	l-Barakāt	(1938-1939),	Kitāb	al-Muʿtabar	fī	l-ḥikma,	3	vols.,	Hyderabad:	Jamʿīya	Dāʾirat	al-Maʿārif	al-Uthmānīya;	repr.	Beirut:	Dār	wa	Maktaba	Biblion,	2012.	
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